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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
DON PUGH, 
vs. 
Plaintiff and Respondent, ) 
CUMON STRATTON and 
RUBY ANDERSON, 
Defendants and Appellants. ~ I 
Case 
No. 
11102 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT AND NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action brought by Plaintiff and Respondent 
for recovery of cattl.e grown by him. 
DISPOSITION OF LOWER COURT 
The lower Court found the issues for the Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiff and Respondent seeks to have affirmed the 
judgment of the trial Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In this statement of facts and throughout this brief the 
Plaintiff and Respondent will be referred to as the Plaintiff, 
and the Defendants and Appellants as the Defendants. 
1 
Since the above entitled matter was submitted to the 
District Court on stipulation, we are of the opinion that it 
is essential to have the stipulated facts set forth in detail. 
WhiJe there are no disputed facts, the brief of the Defend-
ants appears to leave the impr,ession that a Bill of Sale for 
the livestock in controversy was in the possession of Harold 
Woodard, Tri-State Livestock Auction, or some other per-
son who was a predecessor in interest to the Defendants. 
This was not the case and neither Harold Woodard, the Tri. 
State Livestock Auction Company, or anyone acting for 
them has at any time had a Bill of Sale to the livestock in-
volved. 
The stipulated facts found by the Trial Court w,ere as 
follows: 
1. Plaintiff owned and raised 10 head of Hereford 
heifers and 10 head of Hereford steers, which were branded 
with Plaintiff's register.ed brand,PU - on the left ribs and 
the earmark specifically shown in the Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. Plaintiff was the legal owner and had duly regis-
tered the brand and earmark with the Department of Agri-
cultur,e of the State of Utah as required by the laws of the 
State of Utah. 
3. The Plaintiff delivered possession of the livestock 
to one Harold J. Woodard on the 1st day of November, 1966 
after negotiatiom; which took place in Kane County, Utah, 
during which Mr. Pugh (Plaintiff) re0eived a sight draft 
and incorporated Bill of Sale r,equiring payment of $1,648.86, 
which was to be paid by or through the Bank of Southern 
Utah, Cedar, City, Utah. 
4. No Bill of Sale or other instrument conveying title 
was delivered to Harold J. Woodard, Tri-State Livestock 
Auction, or the Defendants (Appellants) herein. 
5. The sight draft and attached Bill of Sale were pre-
sented to the Bank of Southern Utah, at Cedar City, Utah, 
and was dishonored and r 1eturne<l to the Plaintiff. The sight 
draft and attached Bill of Sale has been in possession of the 
Plaintiff since the date of dishonor. 
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6. Harold J. Woodard delivered said livestock to the 
Tri-State Livestock Auction on or about the 3rd day of No-
v,ember, 1966. The Defendant, Cumon Stratton, purchased 
10 head of steers and 1 heifer owned by the Plaintiff and 
branded and earmarked with the Plaintiff's brand and ear-
mark, and the Defendant, Ruby Anderson, purchased 8 head 
of heifers with Plaintiff's brand and earmark. 
7. The 10 head of steers and 1 heifer purchased by 
Cumon Stratton had a reasonable value of $966.30, and the 
8 head of Hereford heifers purchased by Ruby Anderson 
had a reasonable value of $606.72. 
8. 
9. 
10. Neither the Defendants nor their predecessors in 
title have received a Bill of Sale to said livestock in accord-
ance with Section 4-13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, and 
Plaintiff has at all times material in these proceedings re-
tained ownership of said livestock and is entitLed to posses-
sion thereof. 
11. The Defendants purchasing said livestock through 
the Tri-State Livestock Company of St. George, Utah, have 
receiv:ed from said auction separate Bills of Sale upon which 
the auction company makes the express representation that 
it makes no warranties or guarantees concerning said live-
stock and uses the following language: 
"Our responsibility ceases when liv,estock leaves the 
barn. Any statement or guarantee made in regards 
to any livestock sold is the statement of the seller. 
We act as ag,ents only." 
12. The Plaintiff has committed no acts nor made no 
omissions which would estop him from asserting title to said 
livestock. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS NOT TRANSFERRED TO 
DEFENDANTS OR THEIR PREDECESSORS IN INTER-
3 
EST OR CONSIGNED FOR SALE THROUGH A REGU-
LAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS AND APPELLANTS DID NOT 
ACQUIRE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE BY PURCHASING 
AT A LIVESTOCK AUCTION. 
POINT III 
THE COUNTY OF KANE WAS THE PROPER VENUE 
FOR THE HEARING OF THE CA USE OF ACTION FOR 
REPLEVIN. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TITLE TO THE CATTLE WAS NOT TRANSFER-
RED TO DEFENDANTS OR THEIR PREDECES-
SORS IN INTEREST OR CONSIGNED FOR SALE 
THROUGH A REGULAR LIVESTOCK AUCTION. 
As has alr.eady been shown by the Statement of Facts, 
the Def.endants have not at any time received a Bill of Sale 
for the livestock in controversy. At the time the Plaintiff 
was fraudulently induced to give poss.ession of the livestock 
to one Harold Woodard, the Plaintiff did prepare a Bill of 
Sale which he retained. He deposited the Bill of Sale with 
his bank with instructions that it was not to be deJiv.ered 
until payment in full was received. 
Payment was never received and the Bill of Sale was 
retained by the Plaintiff. 
The Defendants have at no time received a Bill of 
Sale to the livestock involved from the Plaintiff, but have 
only received an instrument from the Tri-State Livestock 
Auction Company, Inc. of St. George, Utah, which purports 
to be a Bill of Sale and also uses the following language: 
"Our respo11Clibilitv ceases when the livestock leaves 
the barn. Any st'atrment or guarantee made in re-
gards to any livestock sold is the statemene of the 
seller. We act as agents only." 
4 
The Utah Livestock Brand Act appears to be the ,exclu-
sive method for transferring title to livestock under the 
circumstan0es involved in this matter. Section 4-13-17, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, provides as follows: 
"Bills of Sale - When proof of ownership required. 
-Upon the sale, consignment, alienation or transfer 
of title of any livestock, by any person in this state 
the actual delivery of such animals shall be accom~ 
panied by a written bill of sale from the vendor or 
the party s,elling to the party purchasing giving the 
number, sex, brands, and marks of each animal, date 
and place of purchase, signature and address of both 
s,eller and purchaser; provided, that any person so 
selling or transferring title to said livestock which 
are branded and marked with any brand and mark 
not the recorded brand and mark of person selling, 
shall provide nroof of ownership from whom the 
livestock was purchased and the length of time held 
in his possession." 
The foregoing statute is specific in its requirement and 
appears to be clearly controlling. An attempt to adopt any 
other procedure for th9 handling of livestock would cause 
livestock growers to loose complete control of their livestock 
and the branding act would be nullified. 
There is no dispute that the marks and brands on said 
cattle wer,e the marks and brands recorded in the name of 
the Plaintiff. There was no evidence offer,ed to indicate 
that the Plaintiff had in any way conducted himself in such 
a manner that the Defendants would be mi,sJ,ed and might 
in some manner estop Plaintiff from asserting title to the 
livestock involved. 
Because of the clear markings on the animals, the De-
fendants had notice of the ownership of said livestock by 
the Plaintiff prior to their purchase from the Tri-State 
Livestock Auction Company. 
The State of Idaho has a livestock brand statute which 
is similar to that of the State of Utah. In an interesting 
case Radermacher vs. Daniels et al, 133 P2d 713, it was held ' ~::::..:;;;:,.:..:::..::::.;::.::.;:::.......:...::..;~~~~~....;. 
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that livestock sold by the Defendants, which were branded 
with a brand duly recorded in the office of the Department 
of Agriculture as the Plaintiff's brand, put the Defendants 
on notice of the Plaintiff's ownership. The Idaho Supreme 
Court held that the Defendants were charged w it h legal 
notice of the Plai·ntiff's ownership and could not be innocent 
purchasers for value. 
The purpose and need for the Utah Livestock Brand 
Act is similar to the purpose and need for the Real Estate 
Recording Act. Section 57-3-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953 
provides that the recordation of any instrument in writing 
effecting real estate with the county recorder in which the 
:r:eal estate is located imparts notice to the public and also 
provides: 
" ... and subsequent purchasers, mortgagees, and 
lien holders shall be deemed to purchase and take 
with notice." 
It is argued by the Defendants that the Utah Livestock 
Brand Act dted above has been amended by the Uniform 
Commercial Code. The Defendants suggest that Section 
70A-2-401 (2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
governs this situation. It is interesting to note the I.egisla-
tive history of this particular section and particularly Sec-
tions 60-2-7 and 60-2-8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, which 
were a part of the Utah Sales Act and which sections wiere 
later incorporated into the Uniform Commercial Code.. The 
Utah sales sections were first adopted in the year 1917. 
While these provisions were part of the Utah law, in the 
year of 1939, the Utah State Legislatul'le adopted the Utah 
Livestock Brand Act. The legislature, aware of the 'exist-
ence of the sales act and its purpose, also amended the live-
stock brand act in 1933 and in 1951. The history of the 
sales act and later Uniform Commercial Code clearly dem-
onstrates that the legislature intended the Utah Livestock 
Brand Act to be exclusive and controlling in matters dealing 
with U.vestock. The Uniform Commercial Code became 
effective on January 1, 1966 and merely incorporated 
the rules which were already in effect in this particular 
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area under the original Utah S::tles Act of 1917. It 
is also enlightening to note that a s.ection of the Utah 
Livestock Brand Act was revi€wed by the last legislature 
in the year of 1967 and was amended (See Session Laws of 
Utah, 1967, Chapter 6, Section 1, whkh amended Section 4-
13-20, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.) If the legislature had 
intended Section 70A-2-401 (2), Utah Code Annotated 1953 
as amended to pre-empt the livestock field as contended b; 
Defendants, it would have been a simple matter for the leg-
islature to do so. 
POINT II 
THE DEFENDANTS AN D APPELLANTS DID 
NOT ACQUIRE TITLE TO SAID CATTLE BY 
PURCHASING AT A LIVESTOCK AUCTION. 
There is no 1evi<lence to show that the Plaintiff at any 
time contemplated turning his livestock to a livestock auc-
tion company. Harold Woodard, the person who took pos-
session of the livestock, was also known to place livestock 
with other feeders and to purchas:e directly for livestock 
meat packing companies. The Defendants, in their argu-
ment, are attempting to assume facts not before the Court 
and argue a theory of estoppel. 
The Defondants have contended that the Plaintiff en-
trusted his livestock to a third party who in turn delivered 
them to a livestock auction company for sale. It is contend-
ed that Section 70A-2-403 of the Uniform Commerdal Code 
applies and further that the purchasers in the ordinary 
course of business could acquire good title. The section of 
the Uniform Commercial Code does not apply. 
The Utah Livestock Brand Anti-Th€ft Act, Section 4-
13-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, specifically contemplates 
the type of situation in which the parties to this action are 
involved with the following language: 
"Provided, that any person so selling or transferring 
title to said livestock which ar,e branded and marked 
with any brand and mark not the recorded brand and 
mark of the person selling, shall provide proof of 
ownership from whom the livestock was purchased 
and the length of time held in his possession." 
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The Utah Legislature has provided that w h e n the 
brands and marks are clearly apparent on the animal being 
purchased, the markings give notice of ownership to all per-
sons. TheJ:1efor.e, the purchaser is obligated to establish 
some chain of title from the registered owner of said animal 
before the buyer can be protected in his purchase. 
The Defondants here would clearly have a claim against 
the Tri-State Livestock Auction Company for thei-r breach 
of duty but would not have acquired a ownership interest 
in the livestock. 
The Utah Case of Heaston vs. Martinez, 282 P2d 833, 
as also cited as being applicable and controlling, does not 
appear to apply. The case involves a wholesale automobile 
dealer in Denver, Colorado who sold two automobHes to a 
used car dealer in Murray, Utah. The automobiles 
were not titled in the State of Utah, but were titled 
in the State of Colorado. Therefor.e, a purchaser had 
no method of checking title within this State. Also, 
the seller placed the vehicles with a retail dealer who held 
them in his inventory for saie. Under these circumstances, 
the buy,er c o u 1 d not have had statutory or constructive 
notice of the owner's interest in said vehicles and it also 
appears that there were other factors which would .estop 
the owner from raising the question. 
POINT III 
THE COUNTY OF KAN E WAS THE PROPER 
VENUE FOR THE HEARING OF THE CAUSE OF 
ACTION FOR REPLEVIN. 
The action upon w h i ch the Plaintiff's Complaint is 
founded arose in Kane County. The livestock were taken 
from the Plaintiff in Kane County by false representations 
and converted to the use of the Def.endants' predecessors in 
interest. Since the action for conversion of livestock was 
brought by Plaintiff, he had the following alternatives: 
(1) To bring an action for the return of the livestock, 
or 
(2) To sue the Defendants for money judgment. 
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Section 78-13-7, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, concern-
ing the place of trial, is as follows: 
"All other actions. - In all other cases the action 
must be tried in the county in which the cause of 
action arises, or in the county in which any defen-
dant resides at the commencement of the 
action; ... ". 
The action of Hale vs. Barker, 70 Utah 284, 259 Pac. 
928, has interpreted the section to allow the Plaintiff to 
elect the place of trial in a conversion case and uses the fol-
lowing languag.e: 
"Plaintiff has the right of election under this Sec-
tion to institute the action for conversion of goods 
either in the county where the cause of action arose 
or in the county where the defendant r.esides, the 
plaintiff electing the county where the cause of ac-
tion arose, the defondant has no right . . . . . . to 
change of v.enue, ...... ". 
The case of Schramm-Johnson Drugs vs. Cox, 79 Utah 
276, 9 P2d 399, states that for the purpos.e of venue, 
and venue only, the complaint will be regarded rather liber-
ally in favor of the pleader, in determining whether it states 
a cause of action in torte or in contract. 
The two Utah cases cited Leave no doubt that the action 
for conversion of livestock arising in K an e County was 
properly tried where the liv•estock were taken. 
Under these circumstances, the Court did not err in 
denying Defendants' Motion for Change of Venue. 
CONCLUSION 
We ~espectfully submit the judgment of the trial Court 
~hould be affirmed on appeal. 
OLSEN AND CHAMBERLAIN 
By TEX R. OLSEN 
Attorney for Respondent 
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